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ABSTRACT 
Il ruolo delle imprese nel mondo è creare benessere e fornire alle persone i beni e servizi di cui 
hanno bisogno. Esse hanno un enorme impatto economico, politico e sociale a livello mondiale. 
Le aziende più grandi e che hanno l’impatto maggiore sul mondo sono gestite dai CEO. I CEO 
sono i soggetti che prendono le decisioni più importanti a livello societario. L’ambiente in cui 
gli amministratori delegati operano è altamente incerto e, dato il grande impatto che le loro 
decisioni possono avere, diventa di fondamentale importanza capire quale sarebbe il 
comportamento che permetterebbe loro di assolvere alla funzione per cui vengono assunti: 
massimizzare il valore per gli shareholders. Nel mio studio dimostro che la Teoria dell’Utilità 
Attesa, teoria classica di decisione in condizioni di incertezza, comporta che i CEO, per 
massimizzare il profitto degli shareholders, debbano essere neutri al rischio e agire come 
massimizzatori dell’utilità attesa. Assumo che gli shareholders siano a loro volta neutri al 
rischio e agiscano come massimizzatori dell’utilità attesa. È semplice intuire il perché di questa 
assunzione fondamentale: la maggior parte degli investitori delle medio- grandi imprese sono 
a loro volta grandi investitori con portafogli ricchi e fortemente diversificati il cui unico 
obbiettivo è spesso la ricerca del profitto. Di fondamentale importanza è l’allineamento tra gli 
obiettivi dei CEO e degli investitori. Dopo aver analizzato diversi studi e ricerche che 
dimostrano come gli amministratori delegati nella realtà non siano né neutri al rischio né 
massimizzatori dell’utilità attesa, individuo i tre motivi principali che rendono i CEO 
inefficienti: preferenze relative al rischio, soggettività delle conseguenze e preferenze 
temporali. Individuate le conseguenze trovo rimedi potrebbero aiutare gli shareholders ad 
avvicinare i CEO al comportamento ottimale, neutralità al rischio e massimizzazione dell’utilità 
attesa, per massimizzare il loro valore e ridurre il disallineamento tra gli obiettivi delle parti. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 INTRODUCTION TO THE ROLE OF THE COMPANIES IN THE WORLD 
Thousands of companies are registered daily all over the world. The total amount of 
businesses in the world is approaching to 200 million. Their total value is counted in thousands 
of billions of dollars. This being said we can safely assume that companies have a huge 
economic, political, social and environmental impact in the world.  
Any business is a risky endeavour with an uncertain life expectancy. It has been, and should 
remain, a driver of innovation, a creator of wealth, a harbinger of economic freedom. The core 
mission of a profit-driven enterprise is not to fulfil some philanthropic duty but rather to 
maximize shareholders value. 
The fundamental role of business has remained relatively constant: providing the goods and 
services that people need or want. What has changed dramatically over time are the expectations 
placed on them. Boards of directors, management and investors of large corporations are now 
expected to address an array of social, economic and ecological challenges. 
A company derives its social legitimacy and right to operate from the economic value it creates 
for society at large, from its performance for both investors and a wider network of 
constituencies, its partnership with governments and other agents in solving social problems, 
and the trust its leadership inspires in employees and society as a whole. 
The vast majority of medium and large sized companies, that are the ones that have the biggest 
impact on the world, are managed by CEOs. 
1.2 CEO AND HIS ROLE IN THE COMPANY 
A CEO, which stands for Chief Executive Officer, is the highest-ranking individual in 
a company or organization. The CEO is responsible for the overall success of a business entity 
or other organization and for making top-level managerial decisions. They may ask for input 
on major decisions but they are the ultimate authority in making them.  
In addition to the overall success of an organization or company, the CEO is responsible for 
leading the development and execution of long-term strategies, with the main goal of 
increasing shareholders’ value.  
In larger companies, the executive usually only deals with high-level corporate strategy and 
major company decisions. Other tasks are delegated to other managers or departments. 
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All being said we can assume that the single most important role for which CEOs are hired by 
companies is to maximize shareholders value and they do so by taking the most important 
decisions for the businesses. 
1.3 DECISION MAKING OF CEOs HAPPENS UNDER UNCERTAINTY 
The economic environment in which CEOs act is usually unpredictable and uncertain. 
Individuals concerned with the management of hazardous activities are regularly confronted 
with different forms of uncertainty. Some of these uncertainties concern the nature of the 
dangers associated with production, transport, or research activities, in particular when new 
technologies or innovations are introduced. Other types of uncertainty are caused by changes 
in the organizational, financial and legal context to which the activities must adapt. Another 
category of uncertainties arise given changes in the human, social, political and natural context 
of hazardous activities, in particular structural modifications and the new role played by 
stakeholders. Nonetheless new forms of uncertainty are being introduced by the increased level 
of concern for human and organizational factors of safety and the need to consider the 
complexity of socio-technical systems in a global manner. 
As we could imagine, taking important and impactful decisions under uncertainty is very 
complicated. 
1.4 THE IMPACT THAT CEOs DECISIONS HAVE AND WHY THE TOPIC IS SO 
IMPORTANT 
As we anticipated, companies, therefore CEOs, can have a huge impact on the world and its 
functioning. Therefore this topic is of extreme importance to better understand some of the 
causes that shape the world around us. 
The impact of CEOs decisions is not limited to the economical space but it extends also to any 
imaginable field, helped by the constant growth of globalization and interconnection between 
different fields. 
a) Economic impact. As one should expect economic impacts of companies are huge. In 
any market economy, business plays a big role.  Business is the engine of an 
economy.  It provides jobs that allow people to make money and goods and services 
that people can buy with the money they make.  Without business, the economy would 
be very inefficient and/or very primitive.  
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Companies’ decisions affect: national income, firms output, consumption 
levels, unemployment rates, inflation rates, savings, investments, energy, international 
trades, and international finances. 
They have also a crucial impact on technology and progress that furthermore affects the 
economy. Through the constant competition between firms, companies have to innovate 
if they want to make profits and therefore “survive” in the market. Innovation brings 
new technologies, goods and services that overall contribute to the creation of new 
business spaces and opportunities. Obviously also cooperation could bring the same if 
not more satisfying results and progresses. 
b) Political impact. Politics is largely shaped by the impacts that companies have on 
economy. Governments may make policy changes in response to economic conditions. 
Government regulation of the economy is frequently used to engineer economic growth 
or prevent negative economic consequences. During periods of weak growth, 
economists recommend lowering interest rates to encourage borrowing and restore 
economic growth. In response to inflation concerns, governments may decide to 
increase interest rates. Government policies may use tax incentives to direct economic 
conditions also. The active use of these strategies demonstrates government interest in 
preserving particular economic circumstances to further the economic well-being of 
important stakeholders and the society.  
On a national level, politicians try to reach the highest possible well-being of the state 
reducing unemployment rates, controlling inflation, managing retirement, incentivizing 
investments, stimulating national economy, managing fiscal policies, encouraging 
exportations.  
On an international level, politicians try to reach agreements promoting international 
cooperation, stability, safety and more in general collective well-being.  
Generally speaking, economic growth is beneficial to those in political power who may 
also be seeking re-election. Strong growth typically translates into more hiring and 
higher wages for some workers, although not always. Strong economic growth can also 
lead to higher corporate profits, which is a positive for the stock market. 
c) Social impact. The effects that enterprise activity has on society is overwhelming. 
Companies, based on the goods and the services they offer, shape society’s preferences, 
beliefs, values, usages and cultures.  
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The times in which it was society to “impose” to companies what to produce based on 
its preferences are changed thanks to the globalization and innovation. Nowadays 
companies are the ones that create new needs in people rather than waiting for them to 
externalize their needs.  
The role companies have in society has amplified even more in the last decades due to 
the diffusion of Corporate Social Responsibility and its importance. Corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) is a self-regulating business model that helps a company be 
socially accountable — to itself, its stakeholders, and the public. By practicing corporate 
social responsibility companies can be conscious of the kind of impact they are having 
on all aspects of society including economic, social, and environmental. To engage in 
CSR means that, in the normal course of business, a company is operating in ways that 
enhance society and the environment, instead of contributing negatively to them. All of 
business actors and stakeholders utilize environmental resources, that have had to be 
extracted, and produce pollution that further affects the environment. Though 
businesses can either implement processes that reduce these environmental effects or 
have positive environmental effects. However, the processes that create these positive 
effects will themselves have negative effects, making it all a very complicated 
mechanism.  
1.5 AN INTERESTING EXAMPLE OF CEOs DECISION MAKING AND THE HUGE 
EFFECTS THAT IT HAD 
The Volkswagen emissions scandal represents a great example of the impact that a company’s 
CEOs decisions can have in various areas of interest. 
The Volkswagen emissions scandal began in September 2015, when the United States 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issued a notice of violation of the Clean Air Act to 
German automaker Volkswagen Group. The agency had found that Volkswagen had 
intentionally programmed turbocharged direct injection (TDI) diesel engines to activate 
their emissions controls only during laboratory emissions testing which caused the vehicles' 
NO2 output to meet US standards during regulatory testing, but emit up to 40 times more NO2 
in real-world driving.  Volkswagen deployed this programming software in about eleven 
million cars worldwide, including 500,000 in the United States, in model years 2009 through 
2015. Regulators in multiple countries began to investigate Volkswagen. 
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German prosecutors have charged VW’s ex-CEO Martin Winterkorn over his role in the 
Dieselgate scandal. Winterkorn is accused of knowing about the conspiracy as early as 2014 
but failing to inform regulators or consumers. The former VW CEO is thought to have played 
a substantial role in the scandal. Along with four others, he’s also accused of unfair competition, 
embezzlement, tax evasion, and giving false witness.  If convicted, he faces up to 10 years in 
prison, as well as substantial fines and the return of nearly €11 million ($12 million) in salary 
and bonuses. 
The scandal had huge consequences on various levels: 
a) Health consequences. A study conducted by Berntsen, Aamaas, Lund and Tanaka 
(2018) estimated that approximately 59 premature deaths will be caused by the excess 
pollution produced between 2008 and 2015 by vehicles equipped with the defeat device 
in the United States. The study also found that making these vehicles emissions 
compliant by the end of 2016 would avert an additional 130 early deaths.  
b) Environmental consequences. Ground-level Ozone which damages vegetation and crop 
yields, as well as health implications; acid rain; water quality deterioration; 
contributions to global warming had been facilitated by the pollution of out-norm 
vehicles. 
c) Legal and financial repercussions. Many countries in which the scandal vehicles were 
sold pursued legal actions against Volkswagen for billions of dollars. Many private 
stakeholders and shareholders sued the company as well. 
d) Decrease of the company’s value (by almost a quarter) and number of sales (leading 
profits to drop by 20%). 
e) Transgressions by other manufacturers. The Volkswagen scandal more generally raised 
awareness over the high levels of pollution being emitted by diesel vehicles built by a 
wide range of carmakers, including Volvo, Renault, Mercedes, Jeep, Hyundai, Citroen, 
BMW, Mazda, Fiat, Ford and Peugeot. 
f) Industry consequences. After the scandal, various companies announced plans to make 
major investments into the production of electric vehicles. 
g) Political consequences. Political figures have been accused of knowing about the 
scandal or similar scandals put into action by other car manufacturers, while others 
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exploited the scandal to promote their election promising complete political 
transparency and control. 
2. THE CLASSICAL THEORY 
How should CEOs act and take decisions to fulfil the function which they are hired for by the 
companies (hence maximize the utility of the shareholders of the company)? 
2.1 CLASSICAL THEORY OF DECISION MAKING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: 
EXPECTED UTILITY THEORY INTRODUCTION 
The expected utility theorem is the reference model of choice under uncertainty of the last half 
century. It was developed by Daniel Bernoulli (1738) and expanded by John von Neumann and 
Oskar Morgenstern (1947). The expected utility theory deals with the analysis of situations 
where individuals must make a decision without knowing which outcomes may result from that 
decision, this is, decision making under uncertainty. As we saw, decision making under 
uncertainty is exactly the situation in which CEOs find themselves at the moment of making 
important choices. 
How to deal with uncertainty? 
First of all we need to define the different factors in play in decision making under uncertainty. 
a) There are states of nature or states of the world- all possible configurations of the world. 
One and only one state s will realize.  
b) There are probabilities- ps: probability that state s occurs. 
c) There are actions- a set of possible action that the decision maker can take. 
d) There are outcomes- states and actions jointly determine consequences (outcomes). 
A lottery is a discrete distribution of probability on a set of states of nature. The elements of a 
lottery correspond to the probabilities that each of the states of nature will occur. It is basically 
a distribution over consequences. We could simply assume that the DM has rational preferences 
over a set of lotteries but we would not take advantage of the fact that lotteries have special 
structures. We know that, not only the DM has utility function over lotteries, but also that this 
is somehow related to utility over consequences. In fact, the DM eventually cares about the 
ﬁnal consequences, so preferences over lotteries should have something to do with preferences 
over consequences. 
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One very convenient way to relate preferences over consequences to preferences over lotteries 
is through the Expected Utility theorem. The basic idea of the EU model is that if an agent’s 
preferences satisfy three axioms – ordering, continuity, and independence – then her behaviour 
can be modelled as if she is maximizing expected utility.  Ordering implies preferences are 
complete (for all T,S: either T>S or S>T or both. If the answer is both, then the subject is 
indifferent between T and S) and transitive (if T>R and R>S, then T>S). Continuity means that 
if lottery R is preferred to lottery S, and S is preferred to lottery T, then there are real numbers 
α and β between zero and one such that αR + (1-α)T is preferred to S, while S is preferred to 
βR + (1-β)T.  Independence means that if two lotteries R and S are equally liked by the agent, 
the gamble composed of a p chance of R or a 1-p chance of T must be equally liked as the 
gamble composed of a p chance of S or a 1-p chance of T. 
Suppose that there are three consequences or events.  Let y1, y2, and y3 represent the monetary 
magnitudes of the events, where y1 < y2 < y3.  That is, the first possible outcome is the worst 
event, while the third outcome is the best event.  Let pi reflect the probability that outcome yi 
will be realized, for i = 1, 2, or 3.  Then the lottery p is the vector of probabilities (p1,p2,p3).  
The expected utility hypothesis says that there is an increasing function u(•) over wealth, 
typically called the von Neumann – Morgenstern utility function, such that the an agent prefers 
lottery p to lottery q if and only if V(p) > V(q), where  
  
V(p) = pi .                 (1) 
  
The function V(•) is called the expected utility representation.  Since the three probabilities 
must sum to one, eq. (1) can be simplified to  
  
V(p) = [u(y1) – u(y2)]p1 + [u(y3) – u(y2)]p3.                 (2) 
  
Note the values u(yi) are constants, once the magnitudes of the outcomes are specified.  
Correspondingly, the representation V(•) is linear in the probabilities.  Since y1 < y2 < y3 and 
u(•) is increasing in y, the coefficient on p1 is negative, while the coefficient on p3 is positive.  
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One can plot level curves for the representation in eq. (2) using a two-dimensional diagram.  
An example of this plot, which is known as the Marschak-Machina triangle, is provided in the 
following figure.  
 
The slopes of indifference curves within this diagram can be found by implicitly differentiating 
(2) to get  
  
0 = dV = [u(y1) – u(y2)]dp1 + [u(y3) – u(y2)]dp3                 (3) 
 
↔ dp3/dp1 = -[u(y1) – u(y2)]/ [u(y3) – u(y2)]. 
  
Since the u(yi) are constants, dp3/dp1 is a constant.  That is, indifference curves are parallel 
straight lines. An indifference curve is a graph that shows a combination of two outcomes that 
give a decision maker equal satisfaction and utility, thereby making the DM indifferent. 
The vNM utility functions of the agents are shaped by their risk attitudes. There are three 
different types of risk attitudes: 
 Risk averse. A decision maker is strictly risk averse if she always prefers a sure wealth 
level w to a risky lottery with expected value equal to w. 
 Risk neutral. A decision maker is neutral if she is always indiﬀerent between a sure 
wealth level w and a risky lottery with expected value equal to w. 
 Risk loving. A decision maker is strictly risk loving (risk seeking) if she always prefers 
a risky lottery with expected value equal to w to a sure wealth level w. 
We can finally conclude stating that the expected utility of a decision is a weighted average of 
the utilities of each of its possible outcomes, where the utility of an outcome measures the 
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extent to which that outcome is preferred, or preferable, to the alternatives. The final state 
represents the situation in which the DM will finally find herself into based partly on her 
choices. 
2.2 HOW CEOs SHOULD BEHAVE ACCORDINGLY TO THE EUT 
We have defined the concept of expected utility theory in decision making under uncertainty. 
Given the theory, how should CEOs behave according to the EUT to maximize the value for 
shareholders and fulfil their role? 
Primarily all CEOs should act as expected utility maximizers. That means that they should: 
consider their actions, compute their consequences, attach to every consequence a probability 
and then rate them accordingly to their utility function shaped by their risk attitude. Finally the 
executives choose the best alternative that gives them the highest utility. This alternative should 
in theory align with the highest possible utility of the shareholders that the CEO works for as 
well (we will discuss this later). 
Secondly since in the economical world there are very few certainties, CEOs should be able to 
attach to risky lotteries the right value they have. If a CEO is risk averse he is always willing to 
pay a risk premium to reduce risk. This results in a loss of potential gain for shareholders. On 
the other hand if the DM is risk loving she always refuses a certain gain to choose a lottery with 
the same expected value but riskier. This results in a loss of efficiency and probably also in a 
loss of potential gain for shareholders. As we saw a risk neutral individual evaluates solely 
potential gains and potential losses, compare the two and take decisions based on that.  
I assume that shareholders are also risk neutral and expected utility maximizers. It is simple to 
realize the reasoning behind this fundamental assumption: the majority of medium and large 
sized companies’ investors are in turn big investors with rich and diversified portfolios and their 
objective is often the research of profit. 
An important result that shareholders should try to archive is the alignment between CEOs’ 
objectives and investors’ goals. This implies that also CEOs, as the shareholders, should be risk 
neutral and expected utility maximizers (as we previously explained). We already defined the 
main objectives of shareholders as “maximization of their profit”. While shareholders 
objectives is usually the same, executives objectives are usually very different between one 
another. In hiring a CEO, shareholders have to pay particular attention to a moral hazard issue. 
Moral hazard is a situation in which one party gets involved in a risky event knowing that it is 
protected against the risk and the other party will incur the cost. It arises when both the parties 
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have incomplete information about each other, the so-called information asymmetry. 
Shareholders must align their maximization objectives with the objectives of the CEO they 
decide to hire, clearing immediately the situation, being very transparent about the roles and 
the tasks the executive will need to cover. We will discuss about how this alignment could 
potentially be archived  in chapter 4. 
3. ACTUAL BEHAVIOUR OF CEOs AND REASONING 
3.1 HOW CEOs ACTUALLY BEHAVE 
Does EUT describe well enough how decision makers make decisions under uncertainty? 
The analytically convenient expected utility model has come under increasing suspicion for 
many choices and does not align with the decisions that are actually made in conditions of 
uncertainty. An abundance of experimental evidence points to a particularly strong tendency 
for the expected utility model to fail representing and explaining choices that are actually taken. 
So how do CEOs actually behave and why? 
From an analysis of different papers and researches I found out that CEOs have risk averse 
preferences and that they are not expected utility maximizers. 
I will proceed explaining how I found these results and explain why executives behaviour 
differs so drastically from what the expected utility theory predicts. 
The analysis revealed that there are three main reasons to why CEOs do not behave as the 
classical theory would predict:  
I. Risk preferences;  
II. Subjective beliefs of outcomes;  
III. Time preferences.  
3.2 WHY THEY BEHAVE DIFFERENTLY THAN THEY SHOULD IN 
ACCORDANCE WITH EUT 
I. Risk preferences 
Multiple studies have been conducted to test if the expected utility theory holds. 
One particular study conducted by List and Mason (2009) helps us to get a better grasp about 
the EUT lacks. 
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In this study they advance the literature by exploring CEO’s preferences over small 
probabilities- high loss lotteries. Traditional benefit/cost analyses of economical hazards 
typically compare the expected costs and benefits of various decisions, an approach that 
implicitly assumes agents maximize expected utility. Since many important economic and 
public policy decisions involve small probability- high loss events, it is important to understand 
individual preferences over lotteries for considerable losses; and since the cost- benefit 
approach is linked critically to ability to pay, it is of great import to understand affluent citizens’ 
preferences over small probability- high loss events. 
The goal was to get a subject pool that would be on the opposite end of the “experience 
spectrum” from undergraduate students in terms of evaluating and dealing with risky outcomes, 
while at the same time allowing an analysis of high stake decision making among the relatively 
affluent. The perfect opportunity for them to conduct the experiment came when the Costa Rica 
Coffee Institute (ICAFE) extended an invitation to their annual conference, at which they had 
access to chief executive officers and conference time and floor space on ICAFE grounds to 
carry out experiments. 
By the way their experiments were designed, by examining the pattern of subjects’ choices, 
they could determine whether their choices are consistent whit expected utility representation. 
And, they were provided with a sense of the preference structure of economic actors who are 
in prestigious roles within the international economy. 
The structure of the experiment was this: 
 Stage 1: subjects participated in unrelated treatments in which they earned a monetary 
sum; 
 Stage 2: Once earned their funds, subjects were presented with 40 pairs of lotteries 
called options. Each option was made of 3 lotteries to choose from that had certain p1 
loss of 80$, p2 loss of 30$, p3 loss of 0$. Subjects had to choose the best lottery for each 
pair of lotteries. 
 Stage 3: The monitor had a subject choose one slip of paper out of an envelope that 
contained 40 slips of paper numbered from 1 to 40 that represented the option to play. 
Once the option was determined a different subject drew a slip of paper from a different 
envelope that contained 100 slips of paper numbered from 1 to 100. The number of the 
slip determined the actual outcome ( for example if it was 17 it represented the 
probability that contained that percentage and the outcome related). 
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 Stage 4: Subjects were paid. 
 
From the analysis of the data collected in the experiments they found that both CEO and student 
subject pools exhibit frequent and large departures from expected utility theory.  
First of all their results suggest that use of the expected utility paradigm in decision making 
substantially underestimates executive’s willingness to pay to reduce risk in small probability- 
high loss events. What does that mean? Well it means that CEOs and students both showed 
tendencies of risk aversion and they were both willing to pay some sort of “premium” to reduce 
risk in these types of situations that are ubiquitous in economic decisions exactly as risk averse 
individuals are willing to do. Also it means that the premium that they are willing to pay is not 
well predicted by the EUT model, proving furthermore that CEOs are not expected utility 
maximizers. As I already said, this behaviour would lead to losses for shareholders in terms of 
possible value gained (or not lost in our case). While these earlier experimental results are 
intriguing, virtually all of the previous evidence is based on lotteries over gains. Evidence that 
people may regard gains and losses differently is fairly compelling. Prospect theory, an 
alternative model of choice under uncertainty, explicitly points to differences in risk attitudes 
between gains and losses. This aligns perfectly with the results found and explains why EUT 
substantially underestimates executive’s willingness to pay to reduce risk: simply the losses are 
perceived more drastically than gains unlike the classical model predicts. This is well 
represented by the following figure: 
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Also there are other interesting implications I can deduct from their work. Although willingness 
to pay to reduce the chance of the worst event for CEOs is very similar to the corresponding 
willingness to pay for a typical student we do find some important differences in behaviour 
across subject pools. 
While the results I discuss above point to statistical differences in behaviour, they do not imply 
important economic differences in a sense that the final behaviour of the two groups is very 
similar. From a geometric perspective, such differences are manifested in clear differences in 
the preference maps for the two groups. To investigate the possibility of such a phenomenon, 
they used a regression models studied before to numerically generate indifference curves within 
the Machina- Marschak probability triangle (a graphical tool to estimate indifference curves). 
P3 
1.00 
0.75 
0.50 
0.25 
 0.05 0.10 0.15   P1       
There are two noteworthy features:  
(1) CEOs are “less risk averse” than students. There seems to be an indication that students are 
slightly less likely than CEOs to choose options with a larger probability on the worst outcome. 
This might indicate an overall pattern of students exhibiting a greater degree of risk aversion 
than CEOs, or it might be associated with differences in tendencies to exhibit non- expected 
utility maximization between two groups, or more simply could also come from characteristics 
personal to CEOs as expectancy of the future, experience, competitiveness, trust etc. (all of 
which we will discuss later). 
 (2) it appears that the level curves for CEOs are more convex than the level of curves of the 
students, suggesting that CEOs may exhibit akin to grater aversion to risk at probability 
combination where p2 (the medium loss event) is relatively small. As the extreme payoffs 
become more likely CEOs exhibit greater aversion to risk than students. It is interesting to 
contrast this observation with earlier studies, which tended to find that the most important 
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departures from expected utility paradigm appear in the corners of the triangle, where one 
probability is quite large and the others are quite small. Under the EU approach the preferences 
representation would be linear in the probabilities; the representation is non-linear if the subject 
does not maximize expected utility. They found that nonlinearities are statistically and 
economically important for a substantial percentage of their subjects. Subject behaviour 
indicates that the probability of the worst possible event enters into the preference 
representation in a non-linear fashion- indifference curves over lotteries are often concave. 
Consider a scenario in which a decision-maker initially faces substantial risk. Suppose there are 
two possible outcomes: no loss or a very large loss. Such a combination corresponds to p2 = 0 
in their framework. Now imagine that an “insurance contract” is available, one that reduces the 
chance for the best event, but also lowers the chance of the worst event. Suppose also that such 
an arrangement lies below the tangent line to the indifference curve at the initial lottery. Under 
expected utility, such a policy would be regarded as unambiguously bad. But if the 
representative agent has concave indifference curves it is possible that such a policy leads to an 
improvement in well-being. Neglecting the potential for non-linear preferences could result in 
the under-provision of risk reducing safeguards that are attractive from a collective perspective.   
The Allais Paradox is a well-known example of violation of parallel linear indifference curves.  
As initially presented (Allais, 1953), an individual has to choose between a1 or a2 and between 
a3 or a4, where a1, a2, a3, and a4 are represented as  
a1:  1.00 chance of $1,000,000; 
a2:  .10 chance of $5,000,000, .89 chance of $1,000,000, .01 chance of $0;  
a3:  .10 chance of $5,000,000, .90 chance of 0; 
a4:  .11 chance of $1,000,000, .89 chance of $0.  
Notice that the lines connecting a1 to a2 and a3 to a4 are parallel.  If an agent’s indifference 
curves are straight lines, then he would prefer a1 to a2 and a3 to a4, or he would prefer a2 to a1 
and a4 to a3.  However, laboratory experimentation has shown that subjects usually choose a1 
and a3, so that indifference curves cannot be parallel straight lines. 
Resuming we found that: 
-EUT substantially underestimates executives’ willingness to pay to reduce risk in low 
probability- high loss events; 
-People (CEOs included) consider losses and gains differently; 
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-CEOs are less risk averse than the control group of students, for various reasons; 
-CEOs may exhibit akin to grater aversion to risk at probability combination where p2 (the 
medium loss event) is relatively small; 
Our final conclusion is that CEOs are risk averse, even though less than “regular people”, and 
that they are not EU maximizers. 
II. Subjective beliefs of outcomes 
As we already said, to maximize expected utility, CEOs need to compute the expected value of 
the choices they have and then rate them accordingly to their utility function. Expected value, 
that is the goodness the DM can count on getting, is the product of two simple things: (odds of 
gain) x (value of the gain). The problem is that people, even CEOs, are not that good at 
estimating the two parts of the equation. There are two types of errors people do when 
estimating the EV, and therefore the outcome of their actions. Errors in estimating odds that 
they are going to succeed and errors in estimating the value of their success.  
a) Errors in calculating odds. Calculating odds could seem very easy at first glance: there 
are 6 sides of a dice, there are two sides of a coin, 52 cards in a deck… The problem is 
that in everyday life decisions calculating odds is not that easy and regular as for 
example knowing the odds of getting a two throwing a dice. Why is that? We take a 
simple test conducted by Dan Gilbert in which he asks to US citizens to estimate how 
many people in the us die every year a certain way: tornado, fireworks, asthma, 
drowning. The results of this simple paper are quite interesting. People believe that 
deaths cause by tornado are 564 (against 90 actual deaths), by fireworks are 160 (against 
6), by asthma are 506 (against 1886), by drowning are 1684 (against 7380). Why are 
two things widely underestimated while the other two are widely overestimated? 
Simply, the fact is that death by asthma and drowning do not get much coverage in the 
news since they are in fact very common and uninteresting while death by tornado or 
fireworks get more coverage and come way quicker to mind. What comes quicker to 
our mind could significantly change our perception of odds. This is not the only factor 
that cunts when calculating odds, in fact, there are numerous factors that influence every 
single decision. We found from empirical research that subjects generally have an S-
shaped probability weighting function. We infer that entrepreneurs are uniformly more 
optimistic about the probability of the best outcome than non-entrepreneurs. 
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With greater probability optimism however comes a greater aversion to variability of 
outcomes, and there is an increase in the concavity of the utility function of 
entrepreneurs. This could help us explain why CEOs and regular people seem to exhibit 
the same degree of aversion to risk in decision making under uncertainty. In reality the 
reasoning behind the risk aversion of the two groups is different. 
 
b) Errors in estimating the value of the gain (or loss). People usually compare the gain in 
value they are likely to get (possible gain) with the gain they once had from the same 
investment (past gain). This is a big error because it does not take into account the 
context of the decision. For example, if I where to offer someone a sandwich at a price 
of €20 they would probably say that they would refuse it because people know that a 
sandwich is not worth €20. However if I offered the same sandwich to the same 
individual in a day where all shops were close and they had an empty fridge and were 
very hungry they would be happy to pay €20 for it. Comparing with the past causes 
many of the problems that behavioural economists identify in people’s attempt to 
assigning value. But even when people compare with the possible instead of comparing 
with the past they make some mistakes. For example comparison changes the value of 
things. This trick is often used by marketing specialists. They would put on the shelf 
different types of products inducing people to compare them and choose the deal that in 
comparison seems the better deal. The fact is that when taken out of the comparison 
perspective, the experience of the products do not differ in the end, irrelevantly to the 
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fact that they were compared with one product rather than the other. This line of 
reasoning stays the same when taking decisions over different things (even economical 
decisions). 
In economical decision making calculating odds and estimating values is even more difficult 
due to the troubled context in which economical choices are taken. 
It is clear to see that evaluating outcomes is a very subjective task and not objective at all.  
Subjective beliefs of outcomes are also affected by individual behaviour under uncertainty. 
How do CEOs behave under different types of uncertainty and what differentiates them from 
regular people? 
A very interesting paper regarding this topic was advanced by Holm, Opper and Nee (2013a). 
This study reports findings from the first large-scale experiment investigating whether 
entrepreneurs differ from other people in their willingness to expose themselves to various 
forms of uncertainty. A stratified random sample of 700 chief executive officers from the 
Yangzi delta region in China is compared to 200 control group members. Why entrepreneurs 
routinely accept the high uncertainties associated with entrepreneurial activities has fascinated 
social scientists over centuries. Two broad explanations can be identified. One focuses on the 
ability to develop strategic responses in the presence of uncertainty embedded in the 
environment, the other emphasizes behavioural traits that distinguish entrepreneurs from non-
entrepreneurs in their willingness to accept uncertainty. Their approach aims to elicit 
behavioural differences between entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs. They also introduce two 
methodological innovations: First, instead of relying on convenience samples, their study is the 
first that utilizes large-scale samples of entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs randomly selected 
from firm and household registers. Second, they employ a multidimensional analysis 
incorporating two types of uncertainty rather than just one behavioural trait (non-strategic 
uncertainty and strategic forms of uncertainty). 
They then proceed to form hypothesis to why CEOs could differ from regular people in decision 
making. 
Non-strategic forms of uncertainty comprehend risk and ambiguity. 
Risk 
In the equilibrium, less risk-averse agents become entrepreneurs or CEOs, and more risk-averse 
agents become wage earners.  
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Hypothesis 1A. CEOs differ from others with respect to risk taking. 
Prospect theory suggests that people put too little weight on outcomes not obtained with 
certainty. This phenomenon— denoted as “subcertainty” or as “certainty effect”— explains risk 
aversion in choices involving sure gains. Because it is plausible that executives differ from 
others in their certainty preference, they compare entrepreneurs with ordinary people when 
choosing between a certain and a risky alternative  
Hypothesis 1B. When facing a risky alternative, CEOs have a different preference for 
guaranteed outcomes compared to ordinary people. 
Ambiguity 
Knight (2006) does not claim that executives have a higher or lower aversion to uncertainty 
than others but asserts that entrepreneurs may have a high “capacity for forming correct 
judgments,” implying that entrepreneurs behave differently from others when acting under 
uncertainty. To reserve “uncertainty” as the more general concept, they use in the following the 
term ambiguity for situations where the probability distributions of the outcomes are completely 
or partially unknown. Their hypothesis is therefore as follows:  
Hypothesis 2. CEOs have a different degree of ambiguity aversion than others. 
Strategic forms of uncertainty comprehend competitiveness and trust. 
Willingness to Compete 
An essential feature of entrepreneurship is exposure to competition, which involves a risk 
contingent on the CEO’s performance in comparison to the competitors. There are at least two 
conceivable mechanisms behind differences in the executive’s willingness to compete with 
others. It is possible that they are more optimistic than others or may even be overconfident. 
The other possible mechanism is that entrepreneurs may have a preference for competition per 
se. 
Hypothesis 3. CEOs have a different willingness to compete than others.  
Trust 
Situations involving trust constitute a subclass of those involving risk. They are situations in 
which the risk one takes depends on the performance of another actor.” Trust is the willingness 
to expose oneself to such uncertainty. A delicate task here is to strike a balance between trust 
and control, a task CEOs may be particularly good at. They may in a given situation have a 
different level of trust than others.  
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Hypothesis 4. Trust behavior among CEOs is different from that among others. 
The results of the experiment report as follows. 
-Risk 
Contrary to what many would expect, the CEOs are not more risk taking than other people. (as 
we already discussed the reasons for having a risk averse behaviour are different).  
-Ambiguity 
The results do not suggest that there are any notable differences on the level of ambiguity 
aversion between the groups. 
Non- strategic uncertainty is faced the same way by executives and regular people. This type 
of uncertainty is not controllable by the subjects and that could explain why CEOs act exactly 
as regular people. 
-Willingness to Compete  
Willingness to compete is generally slightly higher among CEOs. There is also a tendency that 
the executives’ distribution of switching points has a slightly lower variance. Higher 
willingness to compete among CEOs therefore seems to be driven by a preference for 
competition per se. 
-Trust 
CEOs are more willing to expose themselves to social risks than the control group. Executives 
routinely rely on ongoing personal ties in upstream and downstream transactions with their 
suppliers and distributors.  
Strategic uncertainty is threated very differently by CEOs and regular people, this seems 
reasonable and explains that executives have different approaches to decision making than 
regular people, due to their experience and their entrepreneurial spirit. They seem to be more 
willing to bear uncertainties involving a strategic element. First of all, executives are 
significantly more willing to enter situations involving multilateral competition than members 
of the control group. Second, the findings suggest that executives are more willing to accept 
uncertainties related to trusting an anonymous other.  
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Clearly entrepreneurship is not a purely individualistic endeavor and requires the willingness 
and ability to cooperate. Trust may therefore provide the glue that makes business networks 
actually work. For this reason we will now focus briefly on cooperation and trust.  
We analyse another study conducted by Holm, Opper and Nee (2015b). 
Guanxi appears to permeate the world of business in China. It is nearly inescapable in business-
to-government exchanges, and ever present in business-to-business transactions. Conceptually, 
Guanxi is defined both as a form of social capital encapsulated in dyadic, particularistic ties and 
as a relational strategy at the organizational level. 
Here their focus is on the strategic utilization of personal relationships as a means of achieving 
organizational goals. In China, the strategic use of personal relationships is pervasive in 
transactions with government authorities as well as in inter-firm relations. Explanations as to 
when and why firms rely on guanxi emphasize a close link between organizational resources, 
environment and corporate strategic choices.  
Investing time and energy in guanxi activities may open doors to opportunities to alleviate 
resource constraints, but also involves distinct risks that not all decision-makers are equally 
willing to accept. The utility of organizational guanxi activities rests on the idea that strategic 
utilization of personal relationships generates benefits otherwise not achievable through 
institutionalized channels. Guanxi activities promise neither certain returns nor certain 
insurance effects. Essentially “guanxi are a futures transaction with unspecified delivery time”. 
Also there is no guarantee in terms of the value or quality of the benefit”. Some CEOs seem to 
have an unlimited appetite for investing in guanxi activities, while others claim to limit 
investments in guanxi to a minimum. 
From this paper we understand that: 
a)CEOs’ risk aversion is negatively associated with guanxi activities with government officials. 
That means that the more a CEO is risk averse, the less he will invest in guanxi activity with 
governments (trust activity). 
b)CEOs’ risk aversion is negatively associated with guanxi activities with other business firm 
leaders. That means that the more a CEO is risk averse, the less he will invest in guanxi activity 
with other firms (trust activity). 
c)The negative association of CEOs’ risk aversion with guanxi activities will relate more 
strongly to guanxi with other business firm leaders than to guanxi with government officials. 
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That means that collaborating with governments is “easier” for risk averse individuals than 
collaborating with other companies. 
d)The negative relationship between CEOs’ risk aversion and guanxi activities with 
government officials and other business firm leaders will be weaker for younger firms than for 
more established firms, ceteris paribus. That means that new firms try to be part of the guanxi 
to benefit of the advantages it gives. 
e)The negative relationship between CEOs’ risk aversion and guanxi activities with government 
officials and with other business firm leaders will be weaker for firms with a local market 
orientation than for firms with a non-local (provincial, national or international) market 
orientation, ceteris paribus. That means that local firms are willing to invest more in guanxi 
activities than non-local firms. 
What this paper shows us is that trust activities are very important for different types of 
companies in reaching their objectives and can help considerably the decision making of CEOs 
with respect to their risk preferences. 
However, a close analysis of the paper also brings to light a quite interesting fact: there is a 
strong argument supporting the view that risk-averse individuals perform better than the risk-
prone when responding to strategic risks. The underlying logic is simple: At the margin, for any 
given risk, highly risk-averse individuals demand a higher expected return to get involved in a 
risky strategy than people who are not as risk-averse; and in parallel, for any given return, they 
will accept a lower risk. Consequently, highly risk-averse CEOs are likely to build a portfolio 
of guanxi activities yielding higher returns for a given risk or involving lower risks for a given 
return than their less risk-averse competitors. The expectation of positive performance effects 
is reinforced by strategy research suggesting that executives who perceive uncertainty in 
business transactions often respond by seeking more information to clarify the circumstances 
surrounding the deal. However we can argue that at the same time there is a huge downside to 
being risk averse in guanxi activities: risk averse individual will pass on a bigger number of 
potential great deals than more risk neutral individual because the lack of information, lack of 
time to do research, their diffidence etc. leading to the loss of a final positive value for the 
shareholders in the end. 
III. Time preferences 
In economics, time preference is current relative valuation placed on receiving a valuable entity 
at an earlier date compared with receiving it at a later date. What may induce a consumer, or 
decision maker in our case, to delay consumption is called discount rate. It represents the 
amount of money that will compensate him or her for foregoing current consumption. This rate 
corresponds with the market interest rate and depends on the consumer or CEO expectation of 
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the future income. If the future income is expected to be higher than the current income, he or 
she will have a high rate of time preference; thus, the interest rate has to be high enough to 
induce savings instead of spending. This simply means that the utility of receiving a valuable 
entity today has to be smaller than the utility of receiving an even more valuable entity in the 
future. There is no absolute distinction that separates "high" and "low" time preference, only 
comparisons with others either individually or in aggregate. Someone with a high time 
preference is focused substantially on their well-being in the present and the immediate future 
relative to the average person, while someone with low time preference places more emphasis 
than average on their well-being in the further future. 
How do time preferences of CEOs conflict with the EUT and how do their preferences differ 
from those of regular people? 
To answer these questions we analyse a paper from Andersen, di Girolamo, Harrison and Lau 
(2014). 
They have conducted a set of field experiments in Denmark that will allow a direct 
characterization of small business entrepreneurs in terms of these traits. For control, they 
sampled the general adult population of Denmark. 
Time preferences are examined by asking subjects to make a series of choices, in this case over 
outcomes that differ in terms of when they will be received. The typical findings from these 
experiments are that subjects have discount rates between 7 and 11% on an annual effective 
basis. The evidence also points to considerable heterogeneity in time preferences across 
identifiable segments of people: CEOs and control group.  
Their results suggest that CEOs are more oriented toward future outcomes and willing to wait 
longer for a certain return than the general population. This is coherent with what we should 
expect. To be expected utility maximizers CEOs should compare future returns with current 
returns as expected values and utilities and then choose the one that gives the highest expected 
return based on the utility functions, acting this way as risk neutral agents. This would allow 
them to maximize profits for shareholders. We already showed that CEOs are actually risk 
averse, so maximization of the shareholders value is not possible. This way we demonstrated 
even further that CEOs do not behave as EUT suggests and are not expected utility maximizers. 
However the paper we analysed also proves that CEOs behaviour is closer to the optimal 
behaviour to maximize utility than that of regular people. 
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4. WAYS TO CORRECT (AT LEAST AT SOME DEGREE) 
THEIR BEHAVIOUR. 
We proved that CEOs are neither expected utility maximizers nor exhibit risk neutral behaviour. 
We already discussed why, to fulfil the role they are hired for and maximize shareholders value, 
they should act as risk neutral agents and follow the expect utility theorem. 
Is there any way shareholders can resolve the problem or at least find a way to move the CEOs 
closer to the ideal behaviour they should have and try to align their and executives’ objectives? 
There are different solutions that could possibly help make executives less risk averse and closer 
to expected utility maximimizers.  
4.1 COMPANIES GUIDELINES AND RULES FOR INVESRMENTS AND PROJECTS 
Companies can reduce the effects of risk aversion by promoting an organization-wide attitude 
toward risk that guides individual executive decisions. More specifically, companies should 
explore the following: 
-Up the investment on risky projects. Risk-averse CEOs often discard attractive projects before 
anyone formally proposes them. To encourage managers and senior executives to explore 
innovative ideas beyond their comfort levels, shareholders might regularly ask them for project 
ideas that are risky but have high potential returns. They could then encourage further work on 
these ideas before formally reviewing them. They could also require managers to submit each 
investment recommendation with a riskier version of the same project with more upside or an 
alternative one. 
-Consider both the upside and downside. Executives should require that project plans include a 
range of scenarios or outcomes that include both failure and dramatic success. Doing so will 
enable project evaluators to better understand their potential value and their sources of risk. 
These scenarios should not simply be the baseline scenario plus or minus an arbitrary 
percentage. Instead, they should be linked to real business drivers such as penetration rates, 
prices, and production costs. For example, when evaluating the introduction of a new consumer-
goods product, managers should explicitly consider what a “home run” scenario would look 
like- one with high market share or high realized unit prices. They should also look at a scenario 
or two that captures the typical experience of product introductions, as well as one scenario 
where it flops. By forcing this analysis, executives can ensure that the likelihood of a home run 
is factored into the analysis when the project is evaluated—and they are better able to 
thoughtfully reshape projects to capture the upside and avoid the downside. 
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-Avoid overcompensating for risk. CEOs should also pay attention to the discount rates they 
use to evaluate projects. We repeatedly encounter planners who errantly use a higher discount 
rate simply because an outcome is more uncertain or the range of possible outcomes is wider. 
Higher discount rates for relatively small but frequent investments, even if they are individually 
riskier, do not make sense once projects are pooled at a company level. Instead, if companies 
are concerned about risk exposure, they might adopt a rule that any investment amounting to a 
certain percentage of the company’s total investment budget must be made in a risk-neutral 
manner—with no adjustment to the discount rate. 
-Evaluate performance based on portfolios of outcomes, not single projects. Wherever possible 
CEOs should be evaluated based on the performance of a portfolio of outcomes, not punished 
for pursuing more risky individual projects. In oil and gas exploration, for example, executive 
rewards are not based on the performance of individual wells but rather on a fairly large number 
of them—as many as 20, in one company. Hence, it may not be surprising to find that oil and 
gas executives pool risks and are more risk neutral. 
-Reward skill, not luck. Companies need to better understand whether the causes of particular 
successes and failures were controllable or uncontrollable and eliminate the role of luck, good 
or bad, in structuring rewards for executives. They should be willing to reward those who 
execute projects well, even if they fail due to anticipated factors outside their control, and also 
to discipline those who manage projects poorly, even if they succeed due to luck. Although not 
always easy to do, such an approach is worth the effort. 
Shareholders, or more in general the corporate centre, must play an active role in implementing 
such changes- in setting policy, facilitating risk taking, and serving as a resource to help pool 
project outcomes. They will need to become enablers of risk taking, a philosophy quite different 
from that currently expressed by many corporate centers. The office of the Chief Financial 
Officer should also be involved in oversight, since it is particularly well suited to serve as 
manager of a company’s portfolio of risks, making trade-offs between them and taking a 
broader view of projects and the effects of risk pooling. 
4.2 CEOs COMPENSATION METHODS 
A-Pay for performance contracts 
CEOs compensations methods is a very controversial topic. People like to speculate on how 
much CEOs are paid and how much they actually deserve. 
Jensen and Murphy (1990) analysed and studied the real issue with CEOs compensations. 
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There are serious problems with CEO compensation, but “excessive” pay is not the biggest 
issue. The relentless focus on how much CEOs are paid diverts public attention from the real 
problem- how CEOs are paid. In most publicly held companies, the compensation of top 
executives is virtually independent of performance. On average, corporate America pays its 
most important leaders like bureaucrats. Is it any wonder then that so many CEOs act like 
bureaucrats rather than the value-maximizing entrepreneurs companies need to enhance their 
standing in world markets? 
Compensation policy is one of the most important factors in an organization’s success. Not only 
does it shape how top executives behave but it also helps determine what kinds of executives 
an organization attracts. This is what makes the vocal protests over CEO pay so damaging. By 
aiming their protests at compensation levels, uninvited but influential guests at the managerial 
bargaining table intimidate board members and constrain the types of contracts that are written 
between managers and shareholders. As a result of public pressure, directors become reluctant 
to reward CEOs with financial gains for superior performance. Naturally, they also become 
reluctant to impose meaningful financial penalties for poor performance. The long-term effect 
of this risk-averse orientation is to erode the relation between pay and performance and entrench 
bureaucratic compensation systems. This could easily be one of the causes of risk aversion in 
CEOs that our empirical data revealed.  
More aggressive pay-for-performance systems (and a higher probability of dismissal for poor 
performance) would produce sharply lower compensation for less talented managers. Over 
time, these managers would be replaced by more able and more highly motivated executives 
who would, on average, perform better and earn higher levels of pay. Existing managers would 
have greater incentives to find creative ways to enhance corporate performance, and their pay 
would rise as well. 
These increases in compensation—driven by improved business performance—would not 
represent a transfer of wealth from shareholders to executives. Rather, they would reward 
managers for the increased success fostered by greater risk taking, effort, and ability. Paying 
CEOs “better” would eventually mean paying the average CEO more. Because the stakes are 
so high, the potential increase in corporate performance and the potential gains to shareholders 
are great. 
B-Stock ownership and stock options 
A used method to incentivize performance is compensation through stock ownership or stock 
options. 
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Stock ownership means that a part of the compensation of the CEOs is given in shares belonging 
to the company they work for. Stock options means that a CEO can eventually decide to redeem 
stocks belonging to the company if he wants to or could even refuse to do so. Compensating 
with ownership may be especially likely to backfire in firms that already face high risk, such as 
those close to bankruptcy. Stock options, on the other hand, should reduce executives’ tendency 
to play it safe. Options motivate executives to increase the stock’s value above a certain strike 
price, which often requires taking smart risks. This should theoretically incentivize executives 
to perform better. 
However, as Lefebvre and Vieider (2013) argue in their paper, stock ownership may in fact 
encourage executives to play it safe and stock options may encourage CEOs to take excessive 
amounts of risk. This paper helps us understand how companies could potentially guide the risk 
preferences of the CEOs through incentives in a way to maximize the outcomes of the 
companies themselves. As we saw CEOs are tendent to risk aversion. Compensation of CEOs 
through stock options renders executives less risk averse. This happens because they can exert 
the option to buy those stocks as well as not. In this case they will prefer to try and maximize 
as much as possible the value of the stock to then exert the rebuy option, even risking to incur 
in a big loss. In this later case they would not redeem the stocks. In the same way, if 
compensated through restricted company stock ownership, experimental CEOs take large 
amount of risks. This contradicts classical financial theory but can be explained through risk 
preferences that are not uniform over the probability and outcome spaces, and in particular, risk 
seeking for small probability gains and large probability losses.  
We can conclude that shareholders should find the right amount of stock ownership and stock 
options to offer to CEOs to guide them towards risk neutrality, avoiding them to be too cautious 
or too incautious. Obviously finding these sweet spots is not easy, but it could lead to a growth 
in shareholders’ final value and is definitively worth it. 
4.3 FIRM TAKEOVERS 
Takeovers are seen as a disciplining force that makes managers less likely to run firms in a 
suboptimal way.  
How so? Consider a scenario in which a firm creates 100 dollars of value. If someone else, 
running the firm differently, could create 110 dollars, than the firm is at risk of being purchased 
by that other party, perhaps for 105 dollars. Because the takeover would probably involve 
replacing management, the mere threat of a takeover keeps managers working hard to make 
sure no one can run the firm more profitably. 
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4.4 CEOs SELECTION 
Hanqing Wang (2015) studied the best CEOs selection process. He discovered some interesting 
results. He found out that less risk-averse candidates are more likely to be hired as CEOs, 
thereby CEOs tend to be less risk-averse than other senior executives. He also found that CEOs 
hired from outside the companies are less risk-averse on average. He finally found that 
companies run by outside CEOs have more volatile performance. These companies also invest 
more heavily in R&D and have higher leverage ratio. These results suggest, due to the low risk-
aversion of outside CEOs, that these companies pursue more risky corporate strategies thereby 
have more volatile performance. The advantages enjoyed by less risk-averse candidates 
identiﬁed in the paper have important real-world eﬀects on company strategies and 
performances as we discussed previously. 
5. CONCLUSION 
Every day the number of companies in the world grows. Companies satisfy a large number of 
fundamental needs people have and their economic, political and social impact on the world is 
huge. CEOs are in charge of running firms. Their main objective is to maximize the value for 
the shareholders that hired them and their main role is to take the most important decisions for 
the companies. The environment in which CEOs make their choices is very uncertain. It is of 
crucial importance to understand how executives take decisions under uncertainty since their 
impact can have remarkable effects on the world around us. To prove the importance of this 
topic I dealt with the example of a real case of decision making of a CEO and the huge and 
various consequences his bad decision making had. 
In this paper I show that in order to maximize the value for shareholders and fulfil the role they 
are hired for, CEOs should be expected utility maximizers and risk neutral. I assume that 
shareholders are also risk neutral and expected utility maximizers. It is simple to realize the 
reasoning behind this fundamental assumption: the majority of medium and large sized 
companies’ investors are in turn big investors with rich and diversified portfolios and their 
objective is often the research of profit. A very important problem not to underestimate involves 
the alignment between CEOs’ and shareholders’ objectives. Shareholders should be transparent 
from the beginning in order to avoid moral hazard issues whit executives. To ensure an 
alignment between shareholders and CEOs objectives, CEOs should be risk neutral and EU 
maximizers (as we already explained) as the investors.
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What I actually found out through the analysis of countless papers and empirical experiments 
is that CEOs are neither expected utility maximizers nor risk neutral. Through this in-depth 
research I noticed some similarities in the papers. I managed to classify the three main reasons 
why executives do not act as predicted by the expected utility theory. They are risk preferences, 
subjectivity of outcomes and time preferences. All of these causes are complementary and 
interconnected one another and isolating them does not provide all the information needed to 
understand the departures from the EUT in CEOs behaviour under uncertainty.  
At that point I wondered if there was any way shareholders could encourage CEOs to be risk 
neutral and expected utility maximizers (or at least reduce the deviation from EUT) and 
therefore maximize their utility. 
I discovered that the methods that shareholders could take advantage in order to try to encourage 
CEOs to behave as they would like involve: companies guidelines and rules for investments 
and projects, CEOs compensation methods, firms takeover, CEOs selection process. Obviously 
making use of these methods is not easy and could require some investments from the 
shareholders, but the results achieved through using them add to investors’ final value and make 
them definitively worth it. 
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